Fifteen years of competition in local public transport, Stockholm Sweden by Nordstrand, Lars
 
 
Insert your chapter title on righthand pages  1 
 
 
9TH CONFERENCE ON COMPETITION AND 
OWNERSHIP IN LAND TRANSPORT 
 
 
Fifteen years of competition in local 
public transport, Stockholm Sweden.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lars Nordstrand, Traffic Director, AB Storstockholms Lokaltrafik, Sweden  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
Public transport of the capital of Sweden has been procured in competition since almost 
fifteen years. Quality to passengers has improved and cost has been reduced. Problems have 
occurred along the road. Experience and changing external conditions have continuously 
developed the way of working. Recent decisions in the board of SL – the PTA of Stockholm – 
confirm that this development will continue. Focus will now be on improved quality 
management, broadend competition, cost control and development of professional 
competence on both sides of the table.  
 
Below you will find an overview of the process from 1990 when the basic decisions were 
taken to 2004 when the  board of SL adopted the principles of continued development of 
contracting of public transport.  
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2. THE SWEDISH MODEL IN SUMMARY 
 
According to legislation from the late eighties local public transport in Sweden is the 
responsibility of regional authorities. There is a PTA (Public Transport Authority) in each of 
the 20 counties, of which Stockholm is one. The PTA is in most cases owned jointly by the 
county council and the municipalities. Normally the local transport services are financed 
partly by ticket revenue and partly by local taxation funds, the relation normally being 60/40 
%. Bus and train operations are contracted out and performed by private companies. The PTA 
normally distributes subsidies, sets fares and regulates the system from political and socio-
economic points of view. 
 
 
 
Long distance bus-lines are in practice free to anyone to operate, while long distance trains 
are operated by the state railway company. Infrastructure is normally funded either by local 
political bodies or by the government.  
 
 
 
 
3. SL 
 
In the Swedish capital region the PTA is called “SL”- AB Storstockholms Lokaltrafik. It is 
100% owned by the county council, unlike in most counties where also the municipalities are 
stakeholders. Thus, SL is responsible for supplying the capital region with public transport 
services. The basic quality standards and regulations are given by the county council, of 
which the SL- organisation is part. Approx. 2 million people live in Stockholm county.  
 
The SL-services constitute more than 50% of the total local public transport in Sweden. They 
form an integrated mix of travel opportunities of underground and commuter train lines, buses 
and local railways weaving together into a seamless system.  
 
Each year SL carries approx. 650 million passengers, corresponding to more than 2,4 million 
boardings per normal day. The market share in the morning peak is close to 75%.  
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4. COMPETITIVE TENDERING IN THE 90-TIES 
 
 
4.1 Organisational change 
 
In order to improve cost effectiveness and management skills in local public transport the 
county council in 1990 initiated a major review of  the existing public monopoly.  
 
The main idea was, and still is, that daily operations are most efficiently performed by private 
operators while society / the PTA takes the responsibility of financing, planning and co-
ordinating the transport system and the infrastructure. 
 
Step by step all activities of SL were put into a number of separate subsidiary companies. 
Administrative functions were separated from traffic operations and thus formed bus a 
operating company, a number of train operating companies, a real estate company, a rail-
infrastructure company etc and also a PTA-company.  
 
The operations were then, after two years of preparations, put to tender over a seven year 
period 1993-1999. This included all traffic and station operations.  
 
In 1990 SL had 12000 employees. Today we have approx 400 in the PTA-organisation in 
spite the fact that our system has expanded and improved considerably. A dramatic change 
has taken place for everyone working in public transport.  
 
Observe that not only traffic operations were outsourced but also administrative services, 
internal consultants, maintenance of infrastructure etc. 
 
During this transition, SL was both the owner of operating companies and the purchaser of 
traffic and station services. This situation called for special solutions regarding independence 
and neutrality. External reviews were made continuously and reported to the board.  
 
In order to clarify the purchasing role the subsidiaries were sold or outsourced in other ways. 
For example in 1999 the underground company SL Tunnelbanan AB was sold to Connex 
(then CGEA). The bus company was in 2002 sold to Keolis in France. The rail maintenance 
subsidiary was sold in 2003. 
 
Presently SL still owns a minority of the shares of a bus operating company (Busslink) and 
the rail maintenance company (Svensk Banproduktion). Maintenance of lifts and staircases is 
still 100% owned due to lack of competition.  
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4.2 Business model 
 
As mentioned, improving cost effectiveness without deteriorating quality was the overall 
objective decided by the county council.  
Introducing competition into public transport was the major tool of achieving this.  
 
A concept of gros cost contract was chosen, focussing the tenderer on cost efficiency. This 
was a type of contract where improved efficiency – cutting costs - was the way that the 
operator could make business profitable during the contract period. A lump sum was paid by 
SL every month with certain marginal bonuses and fines for punctuality and cancellations. 
 
As mentioned a goal was to get a clear organisational picture, where the roles were well 
defined and the credibility of the PTA could not be questioned. Credibility was and still is a 
key word. SL has to have the confidence of the market and has the ambition to be the good 
example.  
 
Very roughly the partition of responsibilities between PTA and operator was as follows: 
 
PTA 
-long term development of transport system 
-integration of system incl fare and ticket pricing 
-co-ordination of operations 
-tendering and contract management 
-financing 
-branding and PR 
-quality standards 
-ownership and development of infrastructure 
 
Traffic and station operator 
-planning and operation of vehicles and staff 
-quality management and customer care 
-local marketing and information 
-maintenance of vehicles 
-fraud reduction and ticket control 
 
The operators should be given as much freedom as possible to use their means of production, 
within the framework set by SL. Three year contracts with an open end were used for the first 
three years. From 1996 five year contracts were introduced with an option of maximum five 
more years. During the second five year period the contracts normally ran with 15 months 
notice..  
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Procurement of bus operations were, and still are, made district-wise. The underlying 
principle being that the operator should be given as much freedom as possible to optimise his 
resources. That would give the best balance between price and quality to SL. The way of 
monitoring the operations was self-control and reports from passengers. As a consequence - in 
the evaluation of tenders - the price was decisive once the basic requirements were fulfilled. 
There was a firm belief in SL management that the operators would improve and develop 
public transport if given freedom from interference from public administration. 
 
 
4.3 Effects  
 
Overall cost for traffic and station services was over time reduced by 25% - approx 900 
million Euro a year. Public transport in Stockholm is now approx. 50% subsidised by the 
local governement  - in the beginning of the nineties the rate was 75 %. Traffic services have 
expanded considerably since.  
 
The number of buses used in operations was reduced by 15% due to introduction of new 
computer-based planning models. Maintenance was optimised and only performed between 
peaks and at night, when the buses and trains were not needed in the streets. Administrative 
staff drive buses in peak hours. The middle management level was heavily reduced.  
 
The lower cost was achieved to 50% during the two years from the SL decision to start 
tendering up to the actual start of tendering processes in 1993. The threat of competition made 
the SL-subsidiaries prepare and increase efficiency substantially. In that situation, the SL 
subsidiaries had no possibility of expansion but only of losing districts to other competitors. 
By Swedish law a publicly owned company has no right to enter into markets outside the 
boarders of the district of the respective authority, in this case being the county of Stockholm. 
The challenge was to lose as little as possible. Under these circumstances actions to reduce 
cost often were agreed between employers and employees without conflict.  
 
Initially quality in terms of punctuality and rate of cancellations improved.  
Not surprising, market knowledge, long term investment in the organisation, passenger needs 
etc however were considered secondary and started slowly declining. That was one reason 
behind the decision to use longer contract periods.  
 
The tenderers tried so hard to win the competition that they submitted “too low prices”. The 
contracts written in the mid and late nineties were - and in some cases still are - loss making 
all over Sweden. This also diminished the incentive for development and long term 
commitment. As will be described further on, the parties acted short-sightedly, pushing 
reinvestments in competence, maintenance etc ahead. 
 
The political decision of introducing competition into the public market of transport was 
opposed by the unions. During the first years of tendering there were a number strikes and 
other actions. More efficient schedules were introduced and staff could – for the first time 
ever – not be sure to keep their job when a procurement was announced. New operators chose 
freely the drivers they wanted and left others without a job. Obviously that was a very 
dramatic change. It also had political implications by the time. Considering the strategic need 
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of a stable supply of drivers, technicians and other staff for public transport in Stockholm, SL 
decided in 1995 to introduce into the contracts the obligation of transfer of employment. This 
is still applied. Progressively a new collective agreement was processed between the bus 
operators and the unions giving bus drivers in SL-operations almost the same employment 
conditions regardless of employer. Autumn 1996 a major step in this direction was taken. This 
process is presently developed into a common agreement for all bus drivers which will be 
fully implemented by 2008.  
 
 
 
5. THE 1998 DECISION 
 
As mentioned above the gros cost contracts worked well in order to promote cost 
effectiveness. In the late nineties however it became obvious that there was need for a review 
of the business model. The driving forces of the contracts were not focussed on the new 
overall objectives of SL – more passengers, improved passenger satisfaction and cost 
effectiveness. 
 
After external and internal evaluations of the tendering process and the application of the 
business model so far, SL turned its focus step by step to delivered quality and subsequently 
on percieved quality. Both unions, bus and train operators and SL itself took part in the 
evaluations. 
 
A strategic decision was then taken in autumn 1998 to 
-focus on quality to passengers 
-strengthen and develop long term business relations 
-reduce the pace of retendering once all traffic operations were contracted out 
-intensify control and monitoring 
 
Unnecessarily frequent tendering was realized by SL as an obstacle for investment by the 
operators in competence and management systems.  
Good business relations were to be developed and procurements were made only “when 
necessary”.  
 
SL should take on a more active role in monitoring operations and quality factors. 
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5.2 Effects 
 
It was highly appreciated by the players on the market when SL in 1998 for the first time 
accepted not only the lowest price but he best tender with regard to cost and quality.  
 
New methods of evaluating qualitative factors in tenders were used. The obvious need for 
quality development made SL choose to introduce incentive schemes on top of some existing 
“gros-cost contracts”. This was expected to be a quicker way to get results.  
 
The incentive schemes have been used mainly in rail operations. They brought several good 
things and not least experience to both SL and the operators. They have however not been as 
efficient as we had hoped them to be. With an underlying business model based on fixed 
price, it was hard to introduce challenging risk-sharing concepts. From an economic point of 
view the incentive schemes formed an opportunity for the operators to improve profitability 
which they, as mentioned above, really needed. In this situation it is not surprising that results 
did not always correspond to expectations. Too often negotiations about additional incentive 
schemes turned into detailed discussions of covering real cost instead of being focused on 
results to be achieved. 
 
As mentioned many of the bus contracts were running with 15 months notice, which 
obviously did not support investment in competence and management methods. 
 
The incentive schemes were focused partly on SL main objectives and partly on known 
quality problems in the respective district or transport mode. Using the result of passenger 
perception studies a dialogue was opened with the passengers. SL and the operator could 
focus improvement on factors that the passengers appreciated as most important and least 
satisfactory.  
 
In bus and rail services incentive schemes have been used regarding e.g.: 
-punctuality 
-number of passengers 
-staff behaviour 
-cleanliness of stations and vehicles 
-graffiti 
-fraud 
 
The schemes have brought new knowledge to SL and to the operators. Beside technical 
measurements also mystery shopping and passenger surveys were and are still being used.  
 
Progressively it was perceived by SL that the ability of the operators to realize the quality 
agreed in the incentive schemes was limited.  
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5.3 Further structural change 
  
As part of this new strategy the SL organisation was restructured. Early 1999 a decision was 
taken to sell the underground operating subsidiary. There were three main reasons for this, 
namely the need to:  
 
-clarify the roles 
-quickly improve quality to passengers 
-challenge and broaden the SL way of working 
 
In summer the same year a majority of the shares was sold to Connex. An incentive scheme 
was introduced at the same time. In 2002 the rest of the shares were sold to Connex following 
a quality review made by SL. 
 
The following year the bus operating subsidiary was merged with another Swedish bus-
operator and sold to Keolis.  
 
A customer service department common for the whole SL system was developed in 1999. All 
passenger information services and complaints is since handled by this common body using 
one telephone number and one web-site in the interface between SL and the passengers.  
 
 
5.4 Major problems 
 
As a background to strategies chosen later on a very short summary of some major 
problematic situations is made here. They also show the slowly growing awareness of all 
parties involved in the complicated structures that are acting in public transport organisation. 
 
5.4.1 Commuter train services 
The transfer of commuter train operations from SJ (the state railway) in the year 2000 became 
caotic. For almost a year traffic operations were reduced. External reviews have stated the 
main reasons to be: 
 
-unsatisfactory preparations made by Citypendeln 
-no active support from SJ 
-political fractions from the unions counteracted the process 
-unawareness of SL of the degree of conflict involved in the process 
-the commuter business not being in advance defined in a separate organisational body 
-not enough focus on take over of staff 
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The caotic start has had a great deal of influence on the economic result of Citypendeln, on 
the contractual relation and also on the political discussion on competition in public transport. 
In 2004 and early 2005 it became obvious that a cancellation of the contracts was the only 
solution. A number of political parties supported by political fractions of the unions wanted 
SL to take home the operations. This was however not the decision of the board. SL is right 
now in progres with a new procurement.  
 
5.4.2 Roslagsbanan 
Connex operations on the local railway Roslagsbanan was in 2002 considered unsatisfactory 
due to high rate of cancellations over a six months period. The reasons being, marginalisation 
of the operations in the total Connex organisation and a loss marking contract. SL cancelled 
the contract for quality reasons and performed very quickly a new procurement. From 2003 a 
new operator offers satisfactory quality, to a considerably higher price. 
 
5.4.3 Swebus 
After winning two big bus-districts in 2002 Swebus made a major mistake in planning 
operations causing many cancellations and unreliable services. SL was forced to use the threat 
of cancellation of both contracts. Swebus took full responsibility and managed to restore 
reliable services by the end of the year.  
 
5.4.4 Maintenance backlog 
n the sale of the underground company a major backlog of maintenance of rolling stock was 
identified. SL had to invest in an overhaul of several cars and systems in order to restore 
normal level of maintenance.  
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6. THE 2004 STRATEGY 
 
For several reasons business development and procurement was delayed in 2001-2003.  
 
In 2004 however the board of SL discussed and finally in the autumn approved of  
 
-strategy of continued procurement of traffic and station services 
-a plan for further procurements covering the next three years 
 
Competition will still be one of the most important tolls for SL in achieving its overall 
objectives.  
 
The board has also accepted guidelines for the next procurement of bus services and of the 
commuter train and station services.  
 
In its strategy the SL-board emphasises: 
 
-continued competitive contracting 
-customer focus 
-long-term sound competition 
-cost control 
-working conditions  
-competence 
-infrastructure 
 
Short comments on these issues will be given below.  
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7. STRATEGIC ISSUES 
 
7.1 New contracts 
 
There is a need to renew the whole stock of traffic operation contracts. The new contracts - 
replacing the model of gross cost contracts -  should focus on the overall objectives of SL: 
more passengers, higher passenger satisfaction level and cost control.  
 
New contracts will be caracterised by e.g. 
 
-focus on SL objectives including socio-economic factors 
-flexible reimbursement pending on fulfilment of requirements 
-higher fines when quality levels are not achieved 
-greater risk for the operator of cancellation of contract  
-monitoring of both delivered and customer perception of quality  
-customer related targets and measures 
-standardisation 
-care of working conditions and take-over of staff 
 
 
7.2 Customer focus and quality management 
 
As mentioned above the ability of the operators to deliver the contracted service levels has not 
been satisfactory. The refocusing from production to customer needs is too slow. SL has 
progressively sharpened the requirements and also taken a number of initiatives in order to 
focus the operators on quality management. Development has been slow. The industry is 
conservative and the influence from successful companies in other industries has been very 
small. This in spite the fact that many international companies under hard competitive 
pressure have improved both economic results and quality output dramatically by introducing 
new management systems.    
 
In the ongoing procurement of bus services the quality variable – system of continuous 
improvement - will outbalance price in the evaluation of tenders. The model has been adapted 
to SL from the Swedish Institute of Quality Management.  
 
In the tendering of commuter train operations and maintenance and of station operations the 
contractor must have ISO-certificates within two years after winning the contract.  
 
Customer perception is now gradually being introduced as a base for evaluating the services 
provided by the operators. Economic incentives are used to encourage improvement and 
avoid deterioration in the services as perceived by the passengers. The objective is that at least 
75% of the passengers should be happy with the services of SL as performed by the operators. 
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Also mystery shopper investigations are used to estimate quality levels and improvement. 
Random quality controls, audits, regular meetings and also automatic control systems will 
also be used.   
 
Customer related quality measures are now being introduced in the ongoing procurements. 
Punctuality is not only expressed as a percentage of late buses or trains over a time period, but 
as a figure telling passenger excess waiting time. In the now ongoing procurement of bus 
services all delays more than one minute compared to timetable is aggregated into excess 
waiting time, which in turn is incentivised. 
 
 
7.3 Long-term sound competition 
 
Lack of competition is a severe threat against the SL strategy. The SL-board therefore 
underlined the need for SL to be active in promoting long term and economically sound 
competition. The internationalisation of the industry will continue. The bus and rail transport 
market is dominated by very big players. Normally 3-4 tenders are submitted when SL makes 
a procurement of bus services, mostly the existing operators. For rail services the number 
normally is 6-7.  
 
In parallel we see local newcomers emerge and be attractive on local markets elsewhere in 
Sweden. They will be aggressive and attractive at least as long as they keep efficient and keep 
customer focussed. New companies sometimes can more easily adapt modern technologies 
and modern attitudes to the market. It is for the PTA:s to make sure that those companies will 
get at fair chance.   
 
SL will take action in order to diminish obstacles for new companies to  
enter into the SL-market. Examples may be to vary the size of the districts, to offer financing 
solution for buses, to forbid combination of districts in tendering etc. We have a constant 
dialogue with potential tenderers in Sweden and abroad both in the transport sector and in 
other industries.  
 
Since 20004 SL has a public plan for the procurements of next three years, making it easier 
for the market to prepare and adapt.  
 
The use of international standards and measurement also makes it easier for new competitors 
to enter the public transport tendering system. 
 
It is also important that SL publicly has stated that from 2005 continuous procurement of 
traffic services will be organised by SL. 
 
SL will continue to own and have control over infrastructure like depots, workshops, 
terminals, stations and rolling stock. This makes it possible for a smooth change from one 
operator to another and most important helps to make competition fair and focused on traffic 
operations and customer service more than real estate etc.   
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7.4 Cost control 
 
After the extremely low pricing of the nineties, price level has increased. In some parts of 
Sweden the increase has been more than 30%. Part of this has been due to the method of 
indexation. In turn this has forced PTA:s in Sweden to reduce traffic services. Measures 
against cost increase of course are very important.  
 
As mentioned modern quality management methods reduce cost and improve quality. It is 
therefore a priority for SL increase the pressure for such change in passenger transport.  
 
Offering bus-financing is also a method of reducing SL traffic cost.  
 
Standardisation of requirements also puts a down-pressure on price.  
  
Meticulous analyses are made of the tenders submitted. SL makes its own tender budgets. 
Loss-making operators do not provide the passengers with good quality services and are 
normally not good and long term business partners. 
 
SL also makes it clear that increasing standards and introducing new comfort e.g air-
conditioning, low-floor buses etc should not be part of the procurement cost but should be 
decided and financed separately.  
 
 
7.5 Working conditions  
 
In the early nineties bidders could compete with lower wages and deteriorated working 
conditions. All SL contracts nowadays state very clearly that the eu-rules of transfer of 
employment shall be valid and that the wages are not to be lowered during the contract 
period. It is in SL interest that working in public transport is attractive now and in the future.  
 
Professional leadership, skills in quality management and modern or even generous working 
conditions will be needed in order to give the people employed a fair chance of giving the 
passengers what they want and what the PTA:s are paying for. SL is right now taking action 
to push the operators in that direction.  
 
The SL responsibility for infrastructure also includes indirect responsibility for working 
environment. SL has not been good enough in this respect and is now in progress of 
improving.  
 
SL has promoted conditions necessary for long term stability and will continue to do so.  
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7.6 Competence 
 
Experience tells us that the transformation of this by tradition heavily technique dominated 
industry to customer orientation takes very much  energy and time. New competence and 
organisation is needed both on  the operators side and in the PTA:s.  
 
A common understanding of the goals and of conditions of both parties is a good base for 
long term co-operation in a traffic service contract.  
 
Experience and competence from other countries and other cultures brought here by new 
partners have contributed to a positive development and have made necessary changes easier.  
 
There is no doubt that new competence is needed on both sides with a commercial 
background but also with a social and marketing skill.  
 
 
 
8. FINAL COMMENT 
 
The semi-regulated model of SL of organising public transport has been successful. SL will 
continue tendering its traffic and station services. Competition has made public transport 
more dynamic and customer oriented and not least, more cost-effective. There is still along 
way to go. 
 
Of course, experience and conclusions from SL are to a great extent related to the legal and 
cultural framework of Sweden and Scandinavian law and industry tradition. After fifteen 
years of hard effort we are convinced that we shall go on developing our model and the 
ambition is to offer our passengers the best local transport.  
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